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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred by Dismissing a Portion of Mr. Clapp 's First Cause of Action 
on a Basis Not Raised in the State's Motion for Summary Disposition Without First 
Giving Him Twenty-Days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis. 
Mr. Clapp's first cause of action was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to 
properly investigate and obtain evidence in mitigation of the crime, "to wit: mental health 
treatment records from Nampa Medical Clinic, and an updated mental health evaluation that 
complied with the requirements ofldaho Code 19-2524." R 201. The state argues on appeal that 
The record demonstrates that the state requested dismissal of lack of sufficient 
supporting evidence and because the claim was disproven by the underlying 
record. The district court granted the motion, dismissing the claim because it was 
disproved by the underlying record. 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 5. However, that is not the case. In fact, the state's specific argument 
was that this claim should be dismissed because "the Defendant had a Mental Health Evaluation 
performed a year earlier .... The Defendant acknowledged this and states that use of the prior 
Mental Health Evaluation was appropriate." R 230-1. That is a waiver argument, i.e., that Mr. 
Clapp could not complain about counsel's failure to obtain both existing medical records and a 
new mental health evaluation because he agreed the prior mental health evaluation was adequate. 
While the trial court dismissed the portion of the claim dealing with failure to request an updated 
mental health evaluation on the same basis as argued by the state, 1 it dismissed the second 
portion of the claim on a different basis: "In addition, Mr. Clapp informed the court that he had 
been suffering from depression and that he had been treated for it. Therefore, the court had the 
1 The court wrote: "Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to obtain an updated 
mental health evaluation because both trial counsel and Mr. Clapp told the court one was not 
necessary. R 280. 
1 
information which the Nampa Medical records showed at the time of sentencing." R 280. This 
is a conclusion that counsel's alleged deficient performance was not prejudicial under Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because the court was told about the information in the 
medical records. That is not the argument made by the state. 
It follows from the above that Mr. Clapp was entitled to twenty-days notice of the court's 
intent to dismiss on a basis other than that argued by the state as required by LC. § 19-4906(b ). 
Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514,211 P.3d 123 (Ct. App. 2009) ("If the state's motion fails to give 
such notice of the grounds for dismissal, the court may grant summary dismissal only if the court 
first gives the applicant the requisite twenty-day notice of intent to dismiss and the ground 
therefore pursuant to LC. § 19-4906(b)."); see also, Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,523,236 P.3d 
1277, 1283 (2010); see also Baxter v. State, 149 Idaho 859,865,243 P.3d 675,681 (Ct. App. 
2010). Further, the court's reason for dismissal of the medical records claim (lack of prejudice) 
is "different in kind" from the state's argument (waiver). Thus, the dismissal of the portion of 
the first cause of action which alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to obtain 
medical records should be vacated. 
While the state argues that a "remand in this case would accomplish nothing," 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 6, that conclusion is not supported by the record. The attached reports 
from the Nampa Medical Clinic include evidence not considered by the court when imposing the 
suspended sentence. While the court knew that "he was under treatment for his depression and 
that he was making significant strides in reducing his alcohol consumption," R 280, the medical 
records would have made a difference because they showed that at the time of the probation 
violation Mr. Clapp was likely suffering from "major depression," a serious mental illness which 
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suggested Mr. Clapp's "functionality is impaired." R 43. Thus, while the records confirm what 
the sentencing court was aware of, they add to that knowledge. They also would have permitted 
counsel to argue that Mr. Clapp's depression was so severe that it caused the loss of functionality 
in his day-to-day life which in turn lead to his relapse, but that the imposition of the sentence was 
not appropriate because his depression could be treated in the community. Remand is required. 
Next, the state argues that the dismissal of the first cause of action can be affirmed on the 
alternative ground that "there is no reason to believe that the Sixth Amendment guarantees of 
effective counsel apply in this case," Respondent's Brief, pg. 7, n. 3, as the right to counsel in 
probation revocation proceedings arise out of the due process clause per Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
411 U.S. 778 (1973). In making this argument, the state argues that the Idaho Supreme Court 
was "wrong" in stating that there was a Sixth Amendment right in State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 
282, 833 P.2d. 911,915,915 (1992), but it does not ask this Court to reconsider that statement. 
It also fails to mention, much less ask this Court to overrule State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 
957 P.2d 352, 354 (Ct. App. 1998) ("A defendant's right to counsel includes legal representation 
during probation violation proceedings.") or State v. Lindsey, 124 Idaho 825, 864 P.2d 663 (Ct. 
App. 1993). The Court of Appeals stated in Lindsey that "Our Supreme Court has held that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to be represented by retained counsel at a 
probation revocation proceedings, and that the right to appointed counsel conferred by LC. § 19-
852, therefore, also extends to probation revocation proceedings." 124 Idaho at 828, 864 P.2d at 
666. The Court went on to note that "under the Idaho Supreme Court decision in State v. Young, 
the case-by-case approach to the right to appointed counsel in probation violation hearing defined 
by the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli . .. is inapplicable in Idaho." Id., n. 
3 
1 (first set of italics added). 
Whether Young's reliance on the Sixth Amendment is right or "wrong," the Court held 
that the right to appointed counsel in probation violation hearings in Idaho was the equivalent to 
the Sixth Amendment right to retained counsel. Thus, the state's argument is precisely 
backwards. There is every reason to believe that the Sixth Amendment requirement that 
appointed counsel be effective counsel applies whether the legal basis for the original 
. 
appointment is statutory, the Sixth Amendment or the Fourteen Amendment. Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353,357 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a 
criminal defendant the right to counsel during the first appeal of right); Evitt v. Lucey, 489 U.S. 
387, 396-397 (1985) (The right to counsel established by Douglas also guarantees the right to 
effective assistance of counsel); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (Strickland v. 
Washington standard applies to claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to 
raise a merits brief); see State v. Galaviz, 291 P.3d 62, 68 (Kan. 2012) ("[A] Kansas criminal 
defendant has a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in a probation revocation 
proceeding under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution."). 
The state's alternative argument is without merit and this Court should vacate that portion 
of the order of dismissal and remand for further proceedings. 
B. The District Court Erred by Dismissing Mr. Clapp 's Fifth Cause of Action on a Basis 
Not Raised in the State's Motion/or Summary Disposition Without First Giving Him 
Twenty-days Notice of its Intent to Dismiss on That Basis. 
Mr. Clapp' s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was based upon counsel's 
failure to raise a challenge to the district court's use of unreliable hearsay at the probation 
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violation dispositional hearing. R 205. Mr. Clapp argues that the court erred in dismissing this 
claim on a basis not raised by the state. In response, the state wrote that "[t]he difference Clapp 
claims to see in the grounds for the motion and the grounds for the order are entirely figments of 
imagination." Respondent's Brief, pg. 10. The record, however, provides tangible proof that the 
court dismissed on grounds different from those argued by the state. 
The state argued the following regarding the fifth cause of action: 
As noted above, State v. Martinez[, 154 Idaho 940,303 P.3d 67 (Ct. App. 2013),] 
stands for the exact opposite of what the Petitioner alludes to. In State v. 
Martinez, the Court in its holding states[:] 
"In line with the considerable authority, we decline to find that defendant's 
right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment and Due Process Clause 
extends to sentencing proceedings. As such, Martinez has not shown that the 
district court erred by considering the statement of a co-defendant whom she had 
not had the opportunity to confront." 
Id., at 949. This allegation fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding either deficient performance or resulting prejudice. 
R 233-234. Thus, the record shows that the state moved for summary disposition arguing that 
the claim should be dismissed because there is no right to confrontation at probation 
dispositional hearings. R 233-34. 
On the other hand, the court dismissed this claim writing that: 
[I]t suffices to say once more that the state was entitled to argue conduct 
underlying dismissed allegation and the Court was entitled to take this conduct 
into account where it was supported by substantial evidence in the record. In this 
case, the Court found the allegations by the defendant's probation officer in her 
report of violation to be credible and substantial evidence regarding the conduct in 
general, and therefore was entitled to refer to the evidence for purposes of 
determining whether to revoke probation and impose sentence. Moreover, given 
the defendant's criminal history and chronic abuse of alcohol, and his admitted 
violation of probation by drinking on a number of occasions, this Court would 
have been justified in revoking probation even had no discussion of the conduct 
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underlying the dismissed allegations occurred. There is no genuine dispute 
regarding the prejudice arm of Strickland test, hence these claims must be 
dismissed. 
R 284-285 (internal citations omitted). Thus, the record shows that the court dismissed the claim 
because it found no deficient performance (because there was no due process violation) and no 
prejudice (because the court could have revoked probation without the disputed information). It 
did not dismiss for the reason argued by the state, i.e., there is no right to confrontation at 
sentencing proceedings. The state's argument that.Mr. Clapp is making this distinction up is 
without factual basis. 
Therefore, the dismissal of this cause of action should be vacated because the court failed 
to give Mr. Clapp the twenty days notice required under LC.§ 19-4906(b) and Buss v. State, 
supra. 
C. In the Alternative, the District Court Also Erred in Dismissing Mr. Clapp's Fifth 
Cause of Action on the Merits of the Claim. Mr. Clapp Presented a Prima Facie Case 
That Appellate Counsel Was Ineffective for Failing to Raise the Claim That the 
Evidence That Mr. Clapp Was Driving Was Not Sufficiently Reliable to Be Considered. 
The state argues that the dismissal on the merits of the claim was proper for two reasons. 
First, "Clapp has failed to show any Sixth Amendment right to counsel on appeal from probation 
violation proceedings" and second he "failed to present a viable claim that right was violated." 
Respondent's Brief, pg. 10. Neither reason is correct. 
As argued above, under State v. Young and its progeny there is a right to counsel at 
probation violation hearing and there is the right to appointed counsel on appeal from such a 
hearing. LC. § 19-852(2)(b ). There is also the right to directly appeal an order revoking 
probation and imposing sentence. I.A.R. 1 l(c)(6). Consequently, such an appeal is a "first 
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appeal as of right" for purposes of Douglas v. California, Evitt v. Lucey and Smith v. Robbins, 
and the right to effective assistance of counsel applies to that appeal. See Commonwealth v. 
Patton, 934 N.E. 236,247 (Mass. 2010) (Trial counsel's failure to file a timely appeal from an 
order revoking probation was ineffective.) 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), cited by the state, is not apposite because in Idaho 
an appeal from an order revoking probation and imposing sentence is not a discretionary appeal. 
It is an appeal as of right. I.A.R. 1 l(c)(6). In Ross, the defendant had an appeal to the state 
intermediate appeal court and the Supreme Court held he did not have the right to counsel in 
order to see discretionary review in the State Supreme Court. 417 U.S., at 610. 
Further, appellate counsel could have raised the due process issue on appeal 
notwithstanding the lack of objection by trial counsel at the revocation proceeding. Mr. Clapp 
had previously objected to the use of the disputed information by the court in setting bond. 
Counsel told the court that in regards to Mr. Clapp driving his father's truck "my client denies 
them adamantly" and while "his probation officer clearly thought he was driving or indicated that 
he admitted to driving, Tyler says that is not true." R 100 (T pg. 22, In. 10-18). Thus the court 
was aware that Mr. Clapp denied the allegation and there was no opportunity to object after the 
court stated Mr. Clapp's alleged driving was used to revoke his probation and imposing sentence. 
In State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010), the Court held that an 
unobjected-to error should cause a reversal when the defendant persuades the court that the error: 
(1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights; (2) the error is clear or 
obvious without the need for reference to any additional information not contained in the 
appellate record; and (3) the error affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. Id. at 226, 245 
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P.3d at 978. Here the error (1) affected Mr. Clapp's unwaived right to be sentenced only upon 
reliable information, (2) the error is clear from the record and (3) the court's reliance on the 
erroneous information led the court to impose sentence. It is telling to note that the court only 
said that it "would have been justified in revoking probation," but did not find that it would have 
done so. R 285. In addition, the court clearly relied upon the driving allegations in denying Mr. 
Clapp's post-revocation I.C.R. 35 motion. ("Furthermore, Mr. Clapp has also shown that he is 
not a good candidiate for supervision in the community-even while on probation for a drinking 
related offense, Mr. Clapp continued to drink and to drive.") R 37. See State v. Velasco, 154 
Idaho 534, 537, 300 P.3d 66, 69 (Ct. App. 2013) (finding that sentencing court's erroneous 
consideration of competency evaluation at sentence required vacation of sentence even though 
the defendant did not contemporaneously object). 
Finally, the claim was meritorious. Mr. Clapp's argument in this regard is set forth at 
pages 13-16 of the Opening Brief which will not be repeated in the interests of brevity but which 
are incorporated herein by this reference. Had the due process claim been raised on appeal, the 
order revoking probation would have been vacated. Thus, the failure to raise the issue on appeal 
was ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and the court erred by summarily dismissing this 
claim. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in the Opening Brief, Mr. Clapp respectfully requests 
that the order of summary disposition as to his first cause of action be vacated in part. He also 
respectfully requests that the order of summary disposition as to his fifth cause of action be 
vacated and the matter be remanded for further proceedings. 
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Respectfully submitted this~y of March, 2015. 
Dennis Benjamin 
Attorney for Tyler Clapp 
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